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“A Deterrent to Vagabonds,
Lazy Persons
and Promiscuous Individuals”
Control and Discretion in the Norwegian Workhouse System,
1845-1907
Frode Ulvund1
Entre 1845 et 1907, le système norvégien des maisons de correction 
était basé sur une Loi des Pauvres autorisant la police à y enfermer des 
vagabonds pour une durée maximale de six mois. Ces mesures relevaient de 
la discrétion policière, sans aucune intervention judiciaire. Cette pratique 
ne fut sérieusement remise en question que vers la fin du XIXe siècle, ce qui 
 conduisit à  l’abolition de ce dispositif. Cet article présente le système des 
maisons de corrections de 1845 à 1907, décrivant ses fonctions et examinant 
le pouvoir discrétionnaire de la police dans un pays dont la  constitution 
prohibait tout châtiment sans procès. La thèse de  l’article est que cet 
enfermement discrétionnaire fournissait à la police et aux collectivités locales 
un instrument  commode pour agir  contre des fauteurs de désordres. Il argue 
également que les entraves croissantes apportées à ce pouvoir entre 1894 et 
1907 devaient davantage au souhait des professionnels du droit de mettre 
la législation en  conformité avec  l’État de droit  qu’à leur préoccupation 
pour la sécurité juridique des pauvres et vagabonds soumis à  l’enfermement. 
Les objectifs de ce dernier et ses cibles demeurèrent les mêmes, bien que 
 l’enfermement en maison de correction perdît de son efficacité après que le 
pouvoir discrétionnaire de la police eût été limité.
Between 1845 and 1907, the Norwegian workhouse system was based 
on the Poor Law which authorised the police to detain vagrants for up to 
six months in the workhouse. These measures were enforced on the basis of 
police discretion without any judicial proceedings. Only towards the end 
of the nineteenth century was this practice seriously questioned, ultimately 
leading to the abolition of the discretionary workhouse system. This article 
presents the Norwegian workhouse system from 1845 to 1907, outlining its 
functions, and discussing the discretionary power placed in the hands of the 
police in a country whose  constitution forbade punishment without legal trial. 
The article argues that discretionary detention was regarded as a flexible 
instrument that allowed the police and local  communities to intervene against 
1 Frode Ulvund is Associate professor in history at the University of Bergen, Norway. He specialises in 
the field of the history of crime and of forced labour. Currently he is working on a project researching 
the impact of Director General Bernhard Getz on the discourse of and practise of forced labour in 
the 1890s in Norway. Recent publications include “En aabenbar Chikane” ? Ole Bulls konflikt med 
politiet i Bergen i 1850’, in Bergen-Bull-Bergenserne. Bergen, Bodoni, (2010), “En Skole, hvori 
han forhærdes istedetfor at forbedres”. Straffanstaltkommisjonens beretning om tukthuset i Bergen 
fra 1841’, in Bergens historiske forenings skrifter (2011) and“At rense gaterne”, Tvangsarbeid som 
disiplinering og sosial kontroll før 1907, in Virker straff ?, forthcoming anthology at Scandinavian 
Academic Press (2012).
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disorderly individuals. It also argues that the increased limitations on the 
 police’s discretionary power between 1894 and 1907 were motivated by a 
legal-professional wish to adapt the legislation to  comply with prevailing 
principles of the rule of law rather than  concerns for the legal protection 
of the paupers and vagrants who were subjected to detention. The aims and 
the groups targeted for detention remained the same, although workhouse 
detentions turned out to be less efficient when the police discretions were 
curtailed.
INTRODUCTION
On a Tuesday in June 1864, a father filed a  complaint against his two daughters, Severine, who was 23 years of age, and Bernhardine Jensen, who was 21, 
due to their idleness2. The  complaint led to interrogation of the girls at the police 
station, and both were issued with a warning. They were told that unless they had 
some form of employment by mid-summer, both would face detention in the local 
workhouse. Bernhardine eventually found employment as a maid, while her sister 
ended up in the Bergen Workhouse because of idleness and immoral  conduct3.
Ten years later, in March 1874, Ingebrigt Monsen was released from the Bergen 
Workhouse. He and his brother had been locked up there since two days before 
New Year, a period of time only interrupted by a ten-day prison term at the end of 
January. After two days as a free man, Ingebrigt was again united with his brother, 
this time locked up in the workhouse for two months. Ten days later, the brother 
was released, but being homeless, he was arrested for vagrancy later that same 
night. Unable to pay for the night in prison, the police declared him without legal 
means of subsistence and sent him for two months to the workhouse on the basis 
of a discretionary police decree4. The brothers were detained and united again on 
a seemingly regular basis. Between 1864 and 1889, the two of them were detained 
no less than seventy-five times in the workhouse, for periods between one and six 
months. In addition they both accumulated several prison sentences. Their father and 
mother also had occasional residency at the workhouse.
Between 1845 and 1907, when a new Vagrancy Act came into effect, forced 
labour in workhouses was authorised by the Norwegian Poor Law of 1845. The 
law enabled the police to detain vagrants, who were defined in the law as “addicted 
to idleness and drunkenness” and thus not able to provide for themselves5. The 
workhouse inmates could be kept locked up for as long as six months on the basis 
of an administrative and discretionary decision by the police alone, and before 1894 
this did not require any written justification. In the larger Norwegian towns, the 
scale of detention under the Poor Law was  considerable. In the 1890s, there were 
about ten workhouses in Norway ; the one located in the capital Kristiania (Oslo) 
2 Bergen State Archive (BSA), Politimesteren i Bergen, ‘Forretningsjournal’ No.4, 1863-1865 (Gover-
nment Document), 14.6.1864.
3 BSA, Politimesteren i Bergen, ‘Forretningsjournal’ No.5, 1867-1870, BSA, Politimesteren i Bergen, 
‘Forretningsjournal’ No.5, 1867-1870 2.10.1867.
4 BSA, Politimesteren i Bergen, ‘Forretningsjournal’ No.8, 1874-1875, 23.3.1874.
5 Lov om Fattigvæsenet i Kjøbstæder 20.sept.1845 [Urban Poor Law 1845], §45, and Lov om Fattigvæ-
senet paa Landet 20.sept.1845 [Rural Poor Law 1845], § 76.
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was by far the largest6. By the mid-1880s, about 1100 persons out of a population 
of 2 million were detained annually, and of these 700 were held in the capital7. The 
numbers went down towards the end of the Poor Law regime, but were still seven to 
eight times higher than in the years after the 1907 repeal of discretionary detentions.
As Paul Lawrence has pointed out in his article on the policing of the poor in 
England and France, police attitudes were rigid and harsh toward vagrants during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, reflecting prevailing social anxieties in 
those countries8. This was equally valid for much of Europe, and Norway was 
no exception. Already in 1844, one of the architects of the Norwegian Poor Law 
declared that the purpose of the workhouse was to be “a deterrent to vagabonds, lazy 
persons and promiscuous individuals, who cannot be  controlled”9. Furthermore, he 
admitted that neither economic benefit nor any lasting moral improvements could 
be expected from such detentions. Yet, he emphasised that detention safeguarded 
society against troublesome persons and at least made them  contribute something to 
their own upkeep.
While criminalisation of vagrancy has a long history, and the  continuous war 
against vagrancy was characterised by repeated waves of policy offensives, the 
measures implemented during the second half of the nineteenth century are particularly 
interesting. Industrialisation and the transformation of the labour market, with its 
emphasis on mobile, wage-earning labour, inevitably led to a reconceptualization 
of unemployment and idleness, since unemployment was  considered fundamentally 
different from being unwilling to work. The free movement of labour was encouraged 
and older laws obstructing such mobility across regions were liberalised or repealed 
in order to create national labour markets. As workers increasingly depended on 
wages and were vulnerable to industrial economic cycles, the question of how to deal 
with involuntary unemployment became increasingly pressing. This was important 
also in order to facilitate the social integration and political loyalty to nation states 
of the emerging wage-earning classes as the suffrage was expanded.
Concurrently, the image was  constructed of an increasing urban residuum 
inflicting great social and moral harm to society at large. This led to widespread 
demands for heavy-handed measures against those who were seen as unwilling to 
work. As a  consequence, it became essential to distinguish between different types 
of able-bodied individuals without employment. The aim was to facilitate and help, 
rather than pauperise, “honest” people who were looking for work, and to discipline 
and  control the remaining “hard-core” of professional vagrants. The template 
was the German network of work stations (Wanderarbeitsstätten or Natural-
Verpflegungsstationen), where migrants looking for work were provided with shelter 
on the  condition that they followed a strict itinerary and subjected themselves to 
a work test10. The English Casual Wards had a similar purpose. In Norway, this 
resulted in the new Vagrancy Act sanctioned by the king in 1900, which removed 
the repressive measures towards vagrants from the Poor Law and reduced the 
stigma of receiving relief – a change that was embraced by labour-friendly groups 
 6 Before 1925, Oslo was named “Christiania”/ “Kristiania”.
 7 Figures from Getz (1887, p. 55).
 8 Lawrence (2004).
 9 Blom, Bassøe (1844, p. 55).
10 Frohman (2008).
32 FRODE ULVUND
as well11. The Vagrancy Act itself, however, was highly unpopular within the labour 
movement, where it was  considered to be class specific legislation that criminalised 
unemployment. Trade unions also feared that it would be used as a weapon against 
collective actions, such as strikes12. Effectively, a dual jurisprudence evolved. On the 
one hand, individual liberties were strengthened as the rule of law and due process 
guaranteed the interests of “respectable” citizens, while arbitrary and extra-juridical 
interventions were legitimised as deterring measures against the “residuum” who 
represented a threat to the social order.
The police were an essential agent in implementing these measures, and 
 considerable power was laid in their hands. Usually some level of discretion was 
employed when police monitored lifestyles or acts  considered to be immoral or 
debauched and not in line with the expectations of the “respectable” working class. 
Discretion was often institutionalised, granting administrative authorities, notably 
the police, the right to order the  confinement of drunkards or vagrants without 
involving the legal system at all. This was the case in Norway ; yet there were other 
examples of administrative detention from parts of Switzerland, as described by 
Sabine Lippuner13. Switzerland did not have federal legislation regulating workhouse 
detentions. Each canton decided the procedures regionally, which included judiciary 
and administrative proceedings as well as detention by adjudication. Some cantons 
became notorious for applying administrative Versorgung as late as 1981. Such levels 
of administrative discretion were rare in Europe, as in most countries administrative 
internments were supervised and could be appealed to the legal system, or delegated 
from it. The Prussian Penal Code of 1851 authorised the police to detain former 
prisoners  convicted of prostitution, begging, vagrancy or for being work-shy for 
as much as two years14. The Imperial German Penal Code of 1871 curtailed these 
powers, but discretion was still integrated into the legal process. When vagrants 
were sentenced to prison, judges could leave to the police to decree additional 
workhouse detention after the end of the prison term. Warren Rosenblum argues 
that the persistence in Germany of such discretion demonstrates that the police 
 concern for  controlling prostitution and vagrancy took precedence over juridical-
liberal principles of due process and justice15. Larry Frohman has argued that lack of 
clear rules regarding the delegation of such power by judges as well as uncertainty 
about the circumstances under which the police was supposed to impose additional 
corrective internment led to arbitrary enforcement16. He also points out that judges, 
aware of the incomplete information available to them, hesitated to delegate decision-
making to police discretion unless the person in question was regarded as hardened 
and incorrigible. As a  consequence, arguments were raised in German – especially 
Prussian – debates in favour of introducing administrative detention without recourse 
11 Seip (1994, p. 164).
12 Newspaper Social-Demokraten 22.05.1900 and Stortingets forhandlinger ; Dokument No.100 ; Fo-
restilling fra “Arbeidernes faglige Landsorganisation i Norge” angaaende odelstingets beslutning til 
lov om løsgjængeri, betleri og drukkenskab (1899-1900). [Records of Proceedings of the Storting, 
Document No.100 ; 1899-1900. Petition from labour union regarding the Vagrancy Act].
13 Lippuner (2005).
14 Rosenblum (2008, p. 20).
15 Ibidem.
16 Frohman (2008).
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to the courts. While such suggestions were rejected during the imperial era out of 
 concerns for principles of individual freedom, the discussion  continued during the 
Weimar Republic.
Far more  common was the informal discretion when authorities at different 
levels enforced regulations on vagrancy. This was particularly the case for 
authorities who were in daily  contact with the target groups of such regulations. 
Stefan Petrow emphasises this point when arguing that the individual policeman 
exercised wide discretion at street level when  considering whether or not to arrest 
a drunken person17. Not only were the circumstances of the vagrant decisive, so too 
were  considerations of how an arrest might inconvenience the police  constable, who 
would have to appear in court while off duty. Paul Lawrence illustrated this point 
by the pragmatic attitudes of both English and French policemen18. The introductory 
example in this article, with the police issuing oral warnings to potential detainees, 
demonstrates this pragmatism at work. Hans Wallentin argues that the scope of un-
protocolled warnings towards vagrants increased in Sweden in the early twentieth 
century, thus transforming  control into a matter between the police and the vagrant 
–  control that was detached from formal institutions19.
The level of discretion exercised in the everyday policing of laws and morals was 
obviously  considerable. The expansion and professionalization of police and state 
bureaucracy from the mid-nineteenth century facilitated the internalisation of social 
 control and discipline outside the framework of the courts. This placed immense 
powers in the hands of the police when they monitored morals and vagrancy, even 
where discretion was not formally sanctioned by law, and made social  control less 
apparent to the wider society.
The scope for discretionary police powers places the Norwegian example 
in a special category when  compared to the workhouse systems elsewhere in the 
Western world, including other Scandinavian countries. The distinctive character 
of workhouse detentions in Norway was also acknowledged by  contemporaries 
within the political and legal sphere. In 1892 the Norwegian Attorney General, Ole 
Anton Qvam  commented that the discretionary practice of forced labour in Norway 
was without parallel in any other country20. Thus, the Norwegian example calls for 
a closer scrutiny. The aim of this article is to present the Norwegian workhouse 
system in the period 1845-1907, to outline its functions, and discuss how the 
scope of discretionary power vested in the police through punishment without trial 
was incompatible with the Norwegian  constitution. The article suggests that the 
workhouse system was regarded as an effective instrument to  control and render 
harmless the lower urban strata, which was often labelled as dangerous to society. It 
further argues that the workhouse, and thus the police itself, was to some extent also 
an instrument employed by neighbours and families to place the responsibility for 
disorderly individuals upon the authorities. This dual function of workhouse detention 
helps explaining why the scope of discretion was surprisingly uncontroversial 
among  contemporaries. The early twentieth-century reforms of the workhouse 
17 Petrow (1994, p. 216).
18 Lawrence (2004, pp. 222-223).
19 Wallentin (1989, p. 66).
20 Stortingets forhandllinger ; Forhandlinger i Odelstinget, 8. del (1892, p. 423). [Records of Procee-
dings of the Storting 1892, Parliamentary debate].
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system, which required a court verdict prior to internment, were partly motivated 
by a desire among an elite within the legal profession to adapt the legislation to 
 comply with prevailing principles of the rule of law. Reforms were not guided by 
 concerns for the legal protection of the paupers and vagrants who were subjected 
to detention. An additional motivation was to remove the “unrespectable” paupers 
from the Poor Law in order to lessen the stigma of poor relief among unemployed 
workers, as the  concept of unemployment changed in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. This legal modernisation was regarded as inevitable, according to many 
administrators of the forced labour system, but also deplorable because it obstructed 
a practice  considered to be both efficient and useful for social  control. The forging 
of the new Vagrancy Act, in force from 1907, as well as the discussions leading up 
to it, illustrates prevailing attitudes towards the workhouse inmates, the detentions 
they were exposed to, and the intended function of this practice in the final decades 
of the nineteenth century.
SCANDINAVIAN WORKHOUSES BEFORE THE WELFARE STATE
In many respects, all Scandinavian countries experienced similar developments 
with regards to social policy from the end of the nineteenth century, as they evolved 
into welfare states that are often labelled the Nordic welfare state model. This 
process started in the latter part of the nineteenth century, although at first the extent 
and  content of welfare institutions were limited. During the formative stages of 
the welfare state it was important to develop effective instruments to distinguish 
between those worthy of receiving public relief and those who were not ; and the 
Scandinavian countries all adjusted their instruments during this period.
In the early nineteenth century there were three different institutions in Norway 
involved in incarceration : prisons, bridewells (tukthus), and “slaveries”. The 
prisons were normally not used for punishment, but as custody houses for those 
awaiting trial. The bridewells were mixed institutions rooted in the handling of the 
poor. From the mid-eighteenth century, the bridewells were closely integrated with 
policies towards the poor. Local authorities were obliged to round up all vagrants 
and ship them to the nearest bridewell after a trial. In 1789, when bridewells became 
the normal punishment for thefts, the institution shifted its main character from an 
institution for social  control to a penal institution.
With the new Penal Code in 1842, the bridewells were exclusively used as penal 
institutions, and they were detached from any  connection with the poor laws. From 
1842 onwards, the bridewells were filled with  convicted criminals sentenced to 
penal servitude of six months or more. Men sentenced to six years or more, served 
their time under military  command in a fortress. Such prisoners were referred to as 
“slaves”, and the fortress prisons as “slaveries”. Moreover, with the Penal Code, local 
prisons shifted from functioning mainly for custody to short-term imprisonment.
In 1842, the new Penal Code severed the ties between the bridewells and the Poor 
Law, as well as the opportunity to detain so-called “unworthy” paupers. However, 
the government was obviously not willing to abandon this instrument altogether, 
and allowed local authorities to establish new workhouses, which were founded on 
the Poor Law of 1845. The law allowed for the incarceration of  convicted beggars ; 
but the most important target was the social residuum among the urban proletariat. 
In other words, a simple administrative decree, without any involvement from the 
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judicial system, allowed the police to detain individuals for periods up to six months, 
if they were known to be idle or alcoholic, and hence suspected to be without legal 
means of subsistence. The decision was final and there was no opportunity for 
appeal. Furthermore, until 1894, there was no requirement for the police to provide 
a formal justification. The only criterion was age, as the detained person had to be 
above 15 years of age.
The ability to summarily detain vagrants generated little discussion in the 1840s, 
and these powers were largely uncontested until the 1890s. The parliamentary 
 committee that prepared the law did discuss whether it was in violation of the 
 constitution, but  concluded that detention in a workhouse was not to be regarded 
as punishment, but as a measure benefitting the inmate as much as the  community 
in which he or she lived21. A  committee revising the Poor Law in the late 1850s 
and early 1860s expressed some scepticism of the discretionary powers vested in 
the local police. However, proposals to place some limitations around these powers 
were met with fierce resistance among local authorities and quickly abandoned by 
government22. Only in the final decade of the nineteenth century was this practice 
seriously questioned, and the procedures slightly revised, as the discretionary 
practices of the police were to be supervised by the Department of Justice. The 
discretionary instrument provided by the Poor Law was in place from 1845 right 
until 1907, when a new Vagrancy Act came into force that introduced judicial 
decisions for such cases. Thus, Norway maintained discretionary detention against 
the “dangerous” poor for a longer period than most countries23. The workhouse 
sentence for vagrancy was abolished as late as 1970.
The experience of being in workhouse detention was very similar to being 
imprisoned in institutions that applied penal servitude with hard labour. The 
inmates were dressed in workhouse uniforms, locked up and guarded day and 
night. The daily routines were similar to those in a prison, as was the type of work. 
Typical work for male detainees  consisted of oakum picking, stone breaking, or 
some handicraft production, while spinning, weaving, or household duties were 
undertaken by the female inmates. Irregular behaviour could lead to disciplinary 
actions, including whipping. A major difference between workhouses and penal 
institutions was that workhouses did not operate with classification and separation 
of inmates – a practice that was increasingly implemented in the penal institutions. 
Major reforms from the 1850s modernised Norwegian prisons in accordance with 
the Philadelphia System, and numerous new prisons were erected in the 1860s based 
on the principles of isolation and classification. The criticism of the old prisons 
never included challenges to the similarly organised workhouses. The argument was 
that most workhouse inmates were incorrigible, and therefore cohabitation day and 
night caused no further moral  contamination. According to the  committee charged 
with estimating the workhouse capacity required following the new Vagrancy Act 
of 1907, the main purpose of the workhouse was not to facilitate rehabilitation, but 
to detain vagrants so that society “got rid of them for a shorter or longer period”24.
21 Recommendation by the standing Church Committee in the Norwegian Parliament dated 9.8.1845, 
here quoted from Midré (1990, p. 101).
22 Ulvund (2002, p. 398).
23 See Hippel (1906, p. 107ff).
24 Om istandbringelse af nye tvangsarbeidsanstalter : indstilling fra den af Justisdepartementet 28de 
september 1905 nedsatte komite (1907, p. 9).
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Detention in workhouses during the latter part of the nineteenth century has 
not received much attention in the Scandinavian historiography. It has been partly 
addressed in relation to topics such as unemployment and poverty. Forced labour as 
a measure against vagrants had its obvious parallels in other Scandinavian countries. 
In both Denmark and Sweden, forced labour was an instrument used towards a 
class of people similar to those targeted in Norway. The Norwegian Department of 
Justice also actively collected information from the neighbouring countries when 
they  considered reforming the practice of forced labour. However, the scope for 
discretion laid down in the Norwegian workhouse system in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century was unparalleled elsewhere in Scandinavia.
In Sweden, it was  compulsory for every individual to have laga försvar (“legal 
protection”) until the Vagrancy Act of 1885. This meant that individuals had to 
produce evidence either by a reference from an employer or by other means, that 
they were able to support themselves. Those unable to provide such a guaranty were 
regarded as vagrants and could be sentenced to forced labour25. Unemployment was 
thus effectively criminalised among the poor. The Vagrancy Act of 1885 authorised 
the royal district governors to decree the detention in a “workhouse for idle persons” 
of those who were not searching for work. A precondition for detention was that 
the person had been officially warned within the last two years26. Such decisions 
were delegated to local police authorities, but had to be presented to the governor 
for approval. If a vagrant resisted detention, the case could be appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Sweden. As a result, forced labour in Sweden was in a much 
stronger sense encapsulated by judicial restraints in  comparison with forced labour 
in Norway ; in Sweden, a senior authority supervised the decrees and each individual 
had the opportunity for court recourse. Nevertheless, the administrative influence 
on detention in Swedish workhouses also raises questions about the legality of the 
procedures, as the Swedish  constitution, like the Norwegian, forbade imprisonment 
without a  conviction.
The transition from laga försvar to the Vagrancy Act after 1885 has been the 
focus of interest for some researchers. Jonas Olofsson discussed the significance 
of the “work approach” in Swedish social policy during a period when the labour 
market was liberalised and temporary unemployment was not only unavoidable, but 
also necessary27. According to Olofsson, the motive behind the Vagrancy Act was 
to distinguish between those who were involuntarily unemployed and those who 
represented a threat to society such as vagrants and criminals28. He argues that under 
the new law, the vagrants lived with the  constant threat of being criminalised and put 
under tutelage. Likewise, Roddy Nilsson shows that the Vagrancy Act and the repeal 
of laga försvar dissolved the close bonds between the regulation of vagrancy and the 
25 See Wallentin (1989).
26 Swedish Vagrancy Law of 12.6.1885, §2. See also Wallentin (1989, p. 12).
27 The“work approach”, or “arbetslinjen” in Swedish, refers to various initiatives aimed at increasing 
labour market participation and emphasises the importance of such participation in the Nordic coun-
tries.
28 Stortingets forhandlinger ; Dokument No.100 ; Forestilling fra “Arbeidernes faglige Landsorgani-
sation i Norge” angaaende odelstingets beslutning til lov om løsgjængeri, betleri og drukkenskab 
(1899-1900). [Records of Proceedings of the Storting, Document No.100 ; 1899-1900. Petition from 
labour union regarding the Vagrancy Act].
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labour market29. He argues that the main function of the Vagrancy Act was to uphold 
order, and the aim was to  control and authorise detention of persons presumed to be 
a threat to order and public safety. In this sense, the Swedish workhouse system had 
obvious parallels to the Norwegian system, although it was not as flexible because 
the decrees were supervised and could be appealed.
In Denmark the Act on Vagrancy and Begging of 1860 and the Poor Law of 
1891  constituted the main legislation authorising forced labour30. According to 
the Vagrancy Act vagrants could be detained in workhouses, but only following 
a  conviction. The Poor Law extended the scope for forced labour by sanctioning 
administrative detention when individuals who were receiving poor relief  conducted 
their lives in violation of public order and decency. This practice was in accordance 
with the Danish Constitution. Poor relief was a  constitutional right, but the 
 condition imposed limitations in the personal freedom of the pauper31. Detention 
in a workhouse was just one example of such limitations, and thus  considered to be 
 constitutional.
Lars Andersen has discussed the  concept of unemployment that prevailed 
in Denmark around 1900. He argues that in the discourse of unemployment, this 
referred to a social problem that needs to be understood in relation to middle-class 
moral  condemnation of unemployment as a moral breach and a form of deviance32. 
As in Sweden and in Norway, the hallmark of public labour market policy was to 
separate the unworthy and unwilling from those worthy and willing to work. The 
poor were to be disciplined and educated in order to live well-ordered and temperate 
lives. The emphasis was on improving work ethics, and workhouses were among the 
instruments for instilling discipline. As such, Andersen highlights the disciplinary 
function of the workhouse on the working class in general.
NORWEGIAN WORKHOUSE INMATES :
MARGINALISED AND DANGEROUS ?
Although Norwegian workhouses were founded on the Poor Law, they had little 
to do with aiding the poor, as outdoor relief was the predominant form of relief. Yet, 
to some destitute people it could be a last voluntary refuge, especially in the cold and 
harsh seasons. It is unclear whether all paupers who approached the police and asked 
to be sent to the workhouse had their wishes granted. All the requests that appear 
in the police journal were cases in which access to the workhouse was granted, yet 
some requests may have been dismissed without being entered in the journal. Once 
admitted, however, these destitute individuals were regarded as regular inmates and 
were not allowed to leave the institution before they had served the period decreed 
by the police.
The most important groups of inmates were people with alcohol addiction, 
homeless individuals, petty criminals, and domestic troublemakers. They could 
all be detained against their will, although sometimes they entered the workhouses 
29 Nilsson (2003, p. 219).
30 Law of 3.3.1860 and Law of 9.4.1891.
31 Danish Constitution of 5.6.1849, §89.
32 Andersen (2005).
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on their own request. Among female detainees, prostitutes  constituted the most 
prevalent group.
Workhouse detention was an urban phenomenon. As many as 97 per cent of male 
and 99 per cent of female inmates in the period from 1901 to 1906 were registered 
in an urban municipality33. The workhouses were located in towns, and for rural 
authorities, it was both inconvenient and costly to transport potential inmates over 
long distances. Moreover, detentions were costly, as the state only paid a portion of 
the expenses. Consequently, local authorities in rural areas often pursued a strategy 
of shifting vagrants across parish borders.
Numerous reports and witnesses claimed that most male inmates suffered from 
alcoholism. One example came from the workhouse chaplain in Bergen. He stated in 
1880 that the male inmates were generally profoundly alcoholic and most had a so-
called “weak” character34. As long as they stayed in the workhouse, they remained 
sober, but once back in the street, they fell back into old habits when they were 
re-exposed to their alcoholic friends. For many, it was only a couple of days before 
they found themselves arrested and back in the workhouse again. While criminals 
received some help and financial support upon release from penal institutions, the 
workhouse inmates received nothing. The  consequences were unsuitable lodgings, 
if any, and the  company of old drinking-friends as their only social network outside 
the workhouse. In addition, bad reputation and ailing health from years of alcohol 
abuse made it difficult for them to find, not to mention retain, any form of work. 
Prejudices against them were often worse than those faced by criminals, thus 
 constituting a situation that was not so different from Eric  Monkkonen’s depiction 
of the poorhouse in Columbus, Ohio, in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Monkkonen describes the paupers as being at the very bottom of the so-called 
“dangerous class” within the United States35.
Contemporaries often highlighted the link between alcoholism and petty crime. 
This is vividly demonstrated in a quote by a workhouse chaplain of an  inmate’s 
description of his and his friends’ routines in the town of Trondheim : “When we 
embark on a drinking binge we keep on till all the money is gone ; then we pawn our 
clothes, and then finally we steal for drinks”36. The majority of male inmates also 
got a criminal  conviction at some point in their life, most often because of theft or 
disorderly and violent behaviour37. A number of persons were also locked up in the 
workhouse for being suspected of criminal acts, where the police was unable to prove 
guilt. One example  concerned the prostitute Nille Nielsdatter. The police journal 
tells us that she was arrested in Bergen in March 1857 under suspicion of having 
 committed theft. By the time of her arrest, she was intoxicated. She was released 
the following day on account of inconclusive evidence, but was then detained in 
the local workhouse for six months38. Another example was Johan Mikkelsen, who 
33 Norges offisielle statistikk, Fengselsstyrelsens Aarbog, Kristiania [Oslo] 1901-1906 [Official Statis-
tics of Norway].
34 Norwegian National Archives (NNA) : Justisdepartementet, Fengselsstyret, Kontor D, Db. L0120/ 
3A 115 2/2, ‘Tvangsarbeidsanstalter, Bergen 1872-1907’. Innberetning 1880.
35 Monkkonen (1975, pp. 155-164).
36 Hval (1884, p. 196).
37 See Ulvund (2002).
38 BSA, Politimesteren i Bergen, ‘Forretningsjournal’ No.1, 1856-1857, 11.3.1857.
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was arrested in 1858 under suspicion of burglary. He was released due to lack of 
evidence. However, because he was without financial means, clothes, or permanent 
work, he was sent to the workhouse for six months39. Evidence suggests that this 
reflects a form of punishment in cases where police was  convinced of guilt, but 
unable to prove the criminal act in court.
Although the police was empowered to detain without  conviction due to their 
administrative prerogatives, and most often without a formal justification, it was 
probably rare to find people being detained in workhouses  completely by chance. 
Being excessively drunk and bad mannered during a night out normally resulted 
in a fine or possibly a night in jail, but did not lead to detention in a workhouse for 
months. Only when this behaviour became repetitive, or when the police suspected 
a criminal lifestyle, could the workhouse be a possible outcome.
As the data in Table 1 suggest, the majority of male inmates in the Bergen 
workhouse were well into adulthood. In every decade between 1850 and 1888, 
the group aged between 30 and 59 was overrepresented,  compared to the overall 
age distribution in the population according to the Bergen census of 1865. This is 
 consistent with trends found elsewhere, such as the Trondheim workhouse where 
65 per cent of male inmates between 1850 and 1867 were between 30 and 59 years 
old40. While the elderly were also overrepresented, the figures clearly indicate that 
the majority of inmates were probably able-bodied men. Compared to those charged 
with criminal offences, the workhouse inmates were much older, as 57 per cent of 
those charged with a criminal offence in Norway between 1846 and 1885 were under 
30 years of age,  compared to 23.8 per cent among the workhouse inmates in Bergen 
between 1850 and 188841.
Table 1 : Male age distribution in Bergen Workhouse 1850-88
and the 1865 census of Bergen. 
15-29 years 30-59 years >=60 years Unknown Sum
n % n % n % n % n %
1850-59 272 25.0 711 65.3 105 9.7 0.0 1088 100.0
1860-69 317 21.6 949 64.7 182 12.4 19 1.3 1467 100,.0
1870-79 407 21.6 1131 60.2 308 16.4 34 1.8 1880 100.0
1880-88 363 28.4 721 56.3 195 15.2 1 0.1 1280 100.0
1850-88 1359 23.8 3512 61.5 790 13.8 54 0.9 5715 100.0
1865 Census 4033 40.0 5007 49.6 934 7.8 112 1.1 10086 100.0
Sources : Bergen Byarkiv [Bergen County Archive] Fattigvesenet. Arbeidsanstaltens arkiv, 1. 
‘Hovedregister 1843-49’, 2. ‘Hovedregister 1847-70’, 3. ‘Hovedregister 1868-76’, 4. ‘Hovedregister 
1876-89’ and Digitalarkivet [The Digital Archive – http ://www.digitalarkivet.no], Bergen census 1865.
39 BSA, Politimesteren i Bergen, ‘Forretningsjournal’ No.2, 1858-1860, 1.5.1858.
40 The Digital Archive [http ://www.digitalarkivet.no] : ‘Tvangsarbeidarar i Trondheim 1850-1867’.
41 Norges offisielle statistikk, Tredie Række No. 73, Oversigt over de vigtigste Resultater af Norges 
Kriminalstatistikk for Aarene 1846-85. Kristiania [Oslo] 1888, p. 20 [Norwegian Official Statistics].
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Typically, workhouse inmates were single. In Oslo, 80 percent of all male inmates 
between 1866 and 1869 were unmarried42. Likewise, in Bergen in the period from 
1876 to 1888, where more than 80 percent of male inmates above the age of 40 were 
either unmarried (61 percent) or in a post-marital stage as a widower or divorcee 
(20 percent)43. This was a  considerable overrepresentation  compared to the general 
urban population. The 1875 census of Bergen shows that only 24 percent of males 
above the age of 40 were unmarried. This difference is hardly coincidental. As one 
can expect higher levels of social  control within the matrimonial framework as well 
as a sense of familial responsibility towards spouse and  children, family and marital 
bonds most likely  constituted an important stabilising factor which prevented people 
from engaging in the kind of lifestyles that relegated men to workhouse detention. In 
addition, the male workhouse detainees were hardly the most attractive prospective 
husbands and  consequently, their opportunity to establish a family deteriorated over 
the years. The workhouse inmates were often marginalised characters who inhabited 
the fringes of society, where they experienced problems with both family and work 
relationships.
The workhouse represented a spiral of despair and destitution, as well as a tool for 
social  control and discipline. Once released from a workhouse, the former inmates 
were under police surveillance, people from the local  community hesitated to employ 
them, and they often found  companionship among other former workhouse inmates. 
The length of time between release and return to the workhouse was likely to narrow 
as the number of stays in the workhouse – whether voluntarily or involuntarily – 
increased. The workhouse inmates were regarded as outcasts of society, and from 
the perspective of the police, the workhouse was an efficient instrument to cleanse 
the streets of these elements.
The profile of female detainees did not mirror that of the male inmates, as the 
females were generally younger, less prone to crime, and less frequently inebriated. 
The majority of female inmates were under 30 years of age (Table 2) and 72 percent 
were under 40 by the time of their detention. Similarly, in Trondheim where 70 
percent of the women detained in the workhouse between 1850 and 1867 were under 
the age of 4044. Over time, the female workhouse population in Bergen became 
younger, and in the 1880s, 70 percent of them were aged under 30. The difference in 
age distribution among the sexes mirrored different causes of their detentions. The 
primary reason for detention of women was prostitution45. In 1879, the workhouse 
chaplain in Bergen explained to the government in his first annual report on the moral 
 conditions in the workhouse that, to his surprise, all the women in the workhouse, 
with a few rare exceptions, were “public” girls, i.e. prostitutes46. Official statistics 
show that 84 percent of the 1,364 women detained in Norwegian workhouses 
between 1901 and the summer of 1907 made their living from prostitution47.
42 Sundt, Christophersen (1978, p. 151).
43 Ulvund (2012).
44 The Digital Archive, (http ://www.digitalarkivet.no) : ‘Tvangsarbeidarar i Trondheim 1850-1867’.
45 Ulvund (2002).
46 NNA : Justisdepartementet, Fengselsstyret, Kontor D, Db. L0120/ 3A 115 2/2, ‘Tvangsarbeidsanstal-
ter, Bergen 1872-1907’. Innberetning 1880.
47 Norges offisielle statistikk, Fengselsstyrelsens Aarbog, Kristiania [Oslo] 1901-1906 [Official Statis-
tics of Norway].
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Table 2 : Female age distribution in Bergen Workhouse, 1850-88
and the 1865 census of Bergen. 
15-29 years 30-59 years >=60 years Unknown Sum
n % n % n % n % n %
1850-59 121 43.5 137 49.3 19 6.8 1 0.4 278 100.0
1860-69 110 37.0 161 54.2 25 8.4 1 0.3 297 100.0
1870-79 246 64.6 113 29.7 18 4.7 4 1.0 381 100.0
1880-88 313 70.3 105 23.6 25 5.6 2 0.4 445 100.0
1850-88 790 56.4 516 36.8 87 6.2 8 0.6 1401 100.0
1865 Census 4334 36.3 5893 49.4 1639 13.7 71 0.6 11937 100.0
Sources : Bergen Byarkiv [Bergen County Archive] Fattigvesenet. Arbeidsanstaltens arkiv, 1. 
‘Hovedregister 1843-49’, 2. Hovedregister 1847-70, 3. ‘Hovedregister 1868-76’, 4. ‘Hovedregister 1876-
89’ and Digitalarkivet [The Digital Archive – http ://www.digitalarkivet.no], Bergen census 1865.
Prostitution was illegal in Norway until a new penal code came into force in 
1905. However, as in many countries, it was quietly accepted as long as it took place 
according to certain regulations. In the larger towns there were brothels with official 
rules regulating the  conduct and  control of prostitutes, and all women suspected 
of prostitution were under disciplinary and medical surveillance. As elsewhere in 
Europe, the system was motivated by the market and demand for sexual services, 
and regulations attempted to  control the spread of venereal diseases.
Women failing to  comply with these rules seldom faced criminal charges for 
prostitution. Instead, the workhouse was used to discipline known or suspected 
prostitutes who behaved inappropriately. With its simplified procedures and lack of 
requirements for evidence, the workhouse was a very efficient instrument to  control 
disorderly prostitutes. The workhouses were also central for  controlling venereal 
diseases and some of them had separate wards for treating venereal diseases. How 
important the detention of prostitutes was became clear after 1894 when police 
discretion in these matters was partly curtailed with the introduction of written 
justifications for administrative detention and requirements that the authorities 
should demonstrate that the detainees was a burdens to society. The prostitutes 
seldom received poor relief. Local police voiced  concern and the government soon 
adopted a more lenient attitude towards the discretion performed. Furthermore, when 
the new Vagrancy Act, with its judicial requirements, was evaluated in 1914, one of 
the  complaints put forward pertained to the difficulties it had caused in  controlling 
prostitution. The repeal of the prostitution section in the Penal Code was enacted in 
1905, which naturally intensified the difficulties in  controlling prostitution. In 1914 a 
former  chief  constable in Bergen explained the attempts by the police to circumvent 
this by charging the women for alcohol addiction instead of prostitution, but they 
had failed in this effort because of the lack of medical evidence that could stand up 
to scrutiny in court48.
48 Stortingets forhandlinger, Oth. prp. No.14 (1914, p. 14). [Records of Proceedings of the Storting. 
Proposition to the Storting (Bill) No. 14, 1914, on amendments to the Vagrancy Act].
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As mentioned previously, the authorities and the police regarded the workhouse 
as a very efficient instrument for cleansing the streets of undesirable elements and 
for  controlling certain groups among the lower classes of the towns. Shortly after 
the workhouse closed in Bergen, the  chief  constable explained how efficient the 
workhouse had been in this respect, and also emphasised how the institution was 
utilised for informally punishing habitual criminals who  committed crimes, but 
where the police were unable to prove their guilt49.
Detention with the purpose of rendering the person harmless was from the 
beginning a central function of the workhouse. As presented in the introduction, this 
aim was already expressed by members of the  committee who drafted the Poor Law. 
The sources of moral  contamination – and the medical  contamination with regard 
to prostitutes – had to be removed from the public sphere. A  commission preparing 
a revision of the Poor Law  concluded in 1856 that the purpose of the workhouse 
was to fight “moral degradation in general”, in addition to idleness, drunkenness, 
and begging50. This struggle against moral degradation was not put into print in any 
formal code, but there is no doubt that the police had this in mind when administering 
the Poor Law and the workhouse institutions.
The same outlook was implicit in the reforms at the end of the century, of which 
many were initiated by Bernhard Getz. He was a brilliant law professor, who served 
as Director General of Public Prosecution from 1889 to 1901. Most of that time, 
he was on leave from his position as Public Prosecutor in order to focus on several 
major legal reforms and worked both within and outside the  commission appointed 
for the revision of the Penal Code. As a major influence on legislative reforms and 
as the principal architect of most of the major social and penal bills at the time, Getz 
played a key role in forming policies of the emerging social liberal state. In 1893 
he clearly expressed his view on the workhouse inmates in a draft to the new Penal 
Code :
If vagabonds are the curse of the countryside, the criminal proletariat of day 
workers are the plague of the larger towns ; persons who spend their days in 
idleness or in the bars, living from theft, income from female prostitution or their 
own, sleeping rough or in half built houses, everywhere being a danger to  people’s 
safety, public moral and personal property51.
Morally and socially speaking, the workhouse inmates were  considered as less worthy 
than the majority and as outcasts of society. Alexander Kielland, the Norwegian 
novelist who was also a critic of the workhouse system, explained in 1889 that the 
workhouse was “a regular residence for the ‘outcast’ of society, people who had seen 
all phases of degradation and humiliation, people that society had written off and 
who had given up on themselves”52.
The workhouse was not only an instrument in the hands of the authorities and the 
police. Though most workhouse inmates were without family ties, and many were 
without fixed dwelling, the initiative to have the person detained could emanate 
49 Olsen (1914, p. 349).
50 Betænkning og Indstilling fra den ved Kongelig Resolution af 5te August 1853 nedsatte Commission 
angaaende det offentlige Fattigvæsen pasa Landet (1856, p. 111).
51 Getz (1893, p. 127). The quotes in this article are translated from Norwegian to English by the author.
52 Kielland (1889).
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from sources other than police authorities. To some the workhouse was a last resort 
to which they applied for admission, but this group seems to have increased over 
time. In the 1850s and 1860s, about 10 percent of the inmates in Oslo had requested 
detention, according to a  contemporary survey53. During the second half of 1894, 
the police journals stated that as many as 70 percent were detained voluntarily in 
Oslo54. These are the figures after the new regulations of 1894, which restricted 
police discretion, especially in cases involving involuntary detention.
The workhouse was also employed to  control unruly family members or 
individuals in the local  community. The importance of neighbours as agents of social 
 control – displaying both the ability and the willingness to intervene in disputes 
and disorderly  conduct – has been emphasised by several historians. Vincent 
Sleebe noted that social  control within a neighbourhood or other kinds of local 
 communities was above all intended to keep every member in line55. In this sense, 
social  control primarily  concerned the  community members and such intervention 
were characterised by informality. However, Sleebe emphasised that the borderline 
between informal social  control, as exercised by people “among themselves”, and 
formal  control, as exercised by institutions and authorities, was vague. The blurred 
line becomes obvious when the formal  control at the local level was exercised by 
officials with personal links to or even representing the neighbourhood in other 
respects. Furthermore, in his study of neighbourhoods in eighteenth-century Paris, 
David Garrioch has argued that  community interventions in disputes were  common 
and even expected, or at least accepted56. Garrioch emphasises how disputes 
between neighbours tended to be noisy and often occurred in public or semi-
public places, such as streets, courtyards, or stairs chaises. Disputes, if not resolved 
between the participants or after peer intervention, might result in an appeal to the 
local  commisarie, and thus slide into the grey zone between formal and informal 
social  control. Similarly, the study of Catharina Lis and Hugo Soly of the eighteenth-
century Austrian Netherlands demonstrates the importance and willingness of 
neighbours and families in requesting forced removal of unruly members of the local 
 community57.
The studies by Garrioch and by Lis and Soly refer to pre-modern societies. 
The modernisation during the nineteenth century has been described as a decline 
in the importance of local  communities due to dynamic urbanisation and growing 
importance of privacy within the domestic sphere. This modification also influenced 
the role of the neighbourhood as an agent for social  control, especially when it 
came to intervening in domestic quarrels or marital violence, where battered wives 
were increasingly isolated and left to their own fate. Elizabeth Foyster has strongly 
53 Sundt, Christophersen (1978, p. 146).
54 Transcripts from police journals from the police in Kristiania, 3rd and 4th quarter of 1894. NNA, 
S-1043, Justisdepartementet, Fengselsstyret D del 1, L0157 ‘Toftes gave 1880-1900. Oppgave over 
innsatte i tvangsarbeidsanstalt 3. kvartal 1894. Fengselsregnskap’ ; NNA : S-1043 Justisdepartemen-
tet, Fengselsstyret D del 1, L0158 ‘Oppgave over innsatte i tvangsarbeidsanstaltene 1894-1895’ 3A 
115 2/6,  departementet’s review of detentions from Kristiania 4. quarter 1894.
55 Sleebe (2004, p. 171).
56 Garrioch (1986, pp. 16-55).
57 Lis, Soly (1996).
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rejected this view, arguing that violence was a mechanism by which family matters 
became  community  concerns, even in the modernising city58.
The evidence from Norwegian workhouses supports this  conclusion as it was 
a mechanism in the regulation of social norms within local  communities. The 
workhouses were infamous among urban dwellers, and in many cases, the mere 
threat to report someone to the police could be an effective method of exercising 
informal social  control within the neighbourhood. At the same time, this obviously 
did not apply to all situations, and the police journals relate several stories where 
local  communities acted against their disorderly members, illustrating incidents 
of breakdown of informal  control in the local  community. Wives reported their 
inebriated and violent husbands, husbands likewise reported their wives, parents 
reported their  children, neighbours reported each other, etc. The two sisters, 
mentioned in the introduction, who were reported to the police by their father is 
one of many examples where family members reported each other. Another case 
was Helene Andersen, who in December 1858, was detained in the workhouse after 
being accused of domestic disturbance and violent behaviour towards her mother59. 
In May 1863, Lauritz Bang was arrested for assaulting his wife60. The wife appeared 
before the police, requesting that her husband should move out of their home. The 
police ordered the husband to refrain from alcohol and unruly behaviour and he 
was warned that he would be detained if further  complaints were presented. In 
another 1863 case, a customs worker in Bergen requested that the police send his 
wife Christine to the workhouse61. He claimed that she was addicted to alcohol and 
had already been to the workhouse several times, as well as in prison. They had four 
 children, and three of them were already relocated to foster parents. The fourth  child 
had also been in care, but the husband was now responsible for the  child. He claimed 
to have no other alternative than to send the  child away again, unless his wife was 
sent to the workhouse. The story was backed by his landlord, so police granted the 
 husband’s request and the wife was detained for six-months. In July of the same 
year, a barrel maker was reported for domestic disturbance and drunkenness, as well 
as for being a nuisance both to his wife and to the other tenants in the house62. He 
was detained for two months.
Bergen was a town with cramped quarters and the residents had little privacy. 
Consequently, an unruly family member also meant an unruly neighbour. Some 
neighbours acted to help a beaten wife, but also to keep order in the neighbourhood. 
Sometimes that meant reporting troublemakers to the police and requesting their 
removal from the local  community via workhouse detention. The sources from 
Bergen reveal numerous examples of the police granting such requests from families 
or local  communities, demonstrating the workhouse as an instrument of social 
 control among the residents of an urban area in the process of rapid modernisation. 
The appeals to the police represented both formalisation and extension of social 
 control, which  contributed to the  complex picture of neighbourhood  control as 
described by Sleebe.
58 Foyster (2005, p. 168).
59 BSA, Politimesteren i Bergen, ‘Forretningsjournal’ No.2, 1858-1860, 9.12.1858.
60 BSA, Politimesteren i Bergen, ‘Forretningsjournal’ No.2, 1858-1860, 20.5.1858.
61 BSA, Politimesteren i Bergen, ‘Forretningsjournal’ No.4, 1863-1865, 2.7.1863.
62 BSA, Politimesteren i Bergen, ‘Forretningsjournal’ No.4, 1863-1865, 1.7.1863.
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Thus, the workhouses in Norway had multiple functions for a range of groups 
within society. It was an instrument available to the police in cleansing the streets of 
undesirable elements, as well as an instrument that allowed neighbours and families 
to shift the responsibility for disorderly people to the authorities as a last resort. 
Although the Norwegian workhouse system was founded upon the Poor Law, it had 
little to do with aiding the poor. It was primarily an instrument of social  control, 
discipline, and social renovation, with the purpose of removing the threat from “the 
outcast” and protecting society. Towards these individuals, the workhouse system 
 constituted a  complete transfer of authority over their lives into the hands of the police 
– a power that was not  controlled by the legal system and was arguably in violation 
of the  constitution. The discussions erupting in the 1890s about workhouse detention 
and police discretion, which eventually brought about the repeal of administrative 
decrees, illustrate that internment and social renovation were the  institution’s major 
functions – one that overshadowed any attempt of rehabilitation.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DETENTIONS ?
Far-reaching discretionary power is, of course, also a problematic tool to maintain 
in a state that is supposed to be governed by the rule of law. A central feature of such 
a law-governed state is that no one can be tried for  conduct that is not prohibited by 
law, and no one can be punished without a  conviction  confirming that such a violation 
has taken place. These principles were proclaimed by the Norwegian Constitution of 
1814, and the courts were accountable to these principles. However, this was not the 
case for workhouse detentions, which illustrates the dual jurisprudence that evolved 
during the nineteenth century.
As mentioned above, the workhouse system was a flexible solution for the 
authorities and local  communities to intervene against disorderly people or potential 
criminals, and the system had a clear function of removing the threat  constituted 
by marginal groups of society. Bernhard Getz, the Director General of Public 
Prosecution, also stated that the benefit of workhouse detention was the opportunity 
to prevent potential criminals from breaking the law in the future63. Given the 
discretionary power granted to the police, it was far more  convenient to discipline 
and detain than to punish. The inability of the workhouse to rehabilitate pointed 
in the same direction, according to Getz. He believed that the maximum length of 
detention of six months was too short, both for those who could potentially turn 
away from old habits and even more so for those who frequently returned to the 
workhouse and for whom there was no hope of improvement. Moreover, reform was 
hampered by the  constant release and return64.
It might have been a  conscious choice to exclude forced labour in workhouses 
from debates on penal reform. As long as the authorities could prevent workhouse 
detention from being defined as punishment, they could also avoid the legal problem 
regarding the protection of inmates. The legislators were not oblivious to the problem 
and briefly discussed the legality of the workhouse clause of the Poor Law. They 
worked around the breach of the Constitution by defining detention in workhouses as 
63 Getz (1893, p. 118, footnote 1).
64 Getz (1893, p. 127).
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 compulsory care and as more a benefit to the inmate than a punishment. As a result, 
the parliamentary  committee that prepared the Poor Law Bill in 1845 discussed 
whether administrative decisions on forced labour violated the  constitution. They 
rejected this objection because “detention in a workhouse should not be  considered 
as a punishment, but as an arrangement for the benefit of the inmate, as well as for 
society in general”65. These strategies for legitimising discretionary detentions were 
quite similar to those that prevailed in Switzerland at the same time, as described by 
Sabine Lippuner66.
The  constitution did not require a judicial ruling before care was provided to a 
citizen. Transferring this definition to workhouse inmates was regarded as somewhat 
dubious by  contemporary critics, but it was not seriously questioned in public 
debates. After years of harsh life with alcohol abuse and lack of proper housing, the 
inmates themselves were often so reduced in their physical and mental capacities 
that they were unable to articulate public protests against the workhouse policies. 
Nevertheless, violent  conduct by inmates within the workhouses was often linked to 
disgruntlement over their detention on the basis of police discretion67.
The fact that workhouse detention was not to be regarded as punishment 
did not prevent officials and politicians from using penal terminology when 
referring to such internment. Before the amendment of the Poor Law in 1863, a 
parliamentary  committee declared that the purpose of forced labour in workhouses 
was “a punishment for begging and vagrancy that can be applied alongside or in 
replacement of imprisonment”68. The  committee also recommended that local 
authorities  combined prisons and workhouses since these were “in many respects 
linked institutions”69. The prison chaplain in Bergen also  consistently referred to the 
inmates as “prisoners” and described their stay in the workhouse as “punishment”. 
Even Director General Bernhard Getz admitted in 1893 that the workhouses were 
“penal institutions in which people can be detained on discretion”70.
The problematic question regarding the lawfulness of workhouse detention was 
briefly addressed by the  commission working on the amendment of the Poor Law 
of 1863. They claimed that, to their knowledge, the police had not abused their 
discretionary power towards workhouse inmates71. Nevertheless, the  commission 
recommended that regional governors should approve all cases of detention in order 
to “avoid abuse”72. Initially, the government supported this view, recognising the 
disadvantages of granting to a subordinate authority “such an extent of discretionary 
power, which is currently vested in the police”. Government authorities also 
65 A proposal by the standing Church Committee in the Norwegian Parliament dated 9.8.1845, here 
quoted from Midré (1990, p. 101).
66 Lippuner (2005, pp. 48-52).
67 Omsted (1911).
68 Stortingets Forhandlinger ; Indst. O. No.28 (1862-1863, p. 109). [Records of Proceedings of the 
Storting 1862-1863 ; Recommendation No.28 from the standing Church Committee regarding 
amendments to the Poor Law].
69 Ibidem.
70 Forhandlinger ved den norske kriminalistforenings andet møde i oktober 1893 (1894, p. 118).
71 Betænkning og Indstilling fra den ved Kongelig Resolution af 5te August 1853 nedsatte Commission 
angaaende det offentlige Fattigvæsen paa Landet (1856, p. 113).
72 Betænkning og Indstilling fra den ved Kongelig Resolution af 5te August 1853 nedsatte Commission 
angaaende det offentlige Fattigvæsen paa Landet (1856, p. 114).
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regarded the proposed  control by the regional governor as a positive change73. In 
his response to the proposed amendments, the regional governor of Kristiansand 
in the south of Norway declared that he could not support deprivation of freedom 
without any legal process. In his opinion a legal process with judicial examinations 
and court ruling was preferable to regional governors  consenting to decisions made 
by the police. Moreover, he thought that a legal ruling was necessary because the 
law allowed the boards of workhouses to use imprisonment as a tool for disciplining 
unruly inmates74.
Nevertheless, there were additional objections against including workhouses in 
the penal system. The regional governor of Jarlsberg and Laurvig, also in the south of 
Norway, claimed that it had never been a problem that the police had this power, and 
the involvement of the regional governor in the process would only delay detentions 
without adding any advantages75. The Board of Guardians in Oslo made exactly the 
same assertion. The board of Guardians, which governed the Oslo workhouse and 
held the authority to release inmates when advisable, testified that the  chief  constable 
of Oslo had never abused his discretionary power. As evidence they claimed that 
they had never released anyone who was not qualified for detention. They argued 
that involving regional governors would only lead to overwhelming workloads for 
the governor and great increase in police paperwork76. A regional administrative 
board for eastern Norway (including Oslo), which had among its members the local 
bishop and the regional governor, came to the same  conclusion. They argued that 
oversight by the governor of police decrees would only lead to an enormous increase 
in bureaucracy without any clear benefits77.
Faced with these objections, the government abandoned its original position, 
although acknowledging that workhouse detention without proper legal process was 
problematic. Consequently, the discretionary power of the police survived the Poor 
Law amendment in 1863. It was more important to keep workhouse detention as an 
efficient instrument than to protect the civil rights of the inmates. Symptomatically, 
the question of civil rights and the  constitution was never discussed when the bill 
was passed through the Norwegian Parliament.
With its summary procedure prior to detention, the workhouse supported the 
interests of the police as social agents and the ruling elite, as well as local  communities 
in dealing with disorderly individuals at the expense of the civil rights of workhouse 
inmates. In 1914, the  chief  constable of Bergen acknowledged this priority when 
looking back on the system : “Admittedly, though the discretionary power of the 
73 Stortingets Forhandlinger ; Indst. O. No.28 (1862-1863, p. 80). [Records of Proceedings of the Stor-
ting 1862-1863 ; Recommendation No.28 from the standing Church Committee regarding amend-
ments to the Poor Law].
74 Stortingets Forhandlinger 1862-1863, Indst. O. No.28 (p. 37). [Records of Proceedings of the Stor-
ting 1862-1863 ; Recommendation No.28 from the standing Church Committee regarding amend-
ments to the Poor Law].
75 Ibidem.
76 Stortingets Forhandlinger ; Indst. O. No.28 (1862-1863, p. 78f). [Records of Proceedings of the Stor-
ting 1862-1863 ; Recommendation No.28 from the standing Church Committee regarding amend-
ments to the Poor Law].
77 Stortingets Forhandlinger ; Indst. O. No.28 (1862-1863, p. 79). [Records of Proceedings of the Stor-
ting 1862-1863 ; Recommendation No.28 from the standing Church Committee regarding amend-
ments to the Poor Law].
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police to deprive people of their freedom without any legal process was not abused, 
theoretically it was not reassuring [….]”78 The legal framework for forced labour 
in workhouses was not changed until the new Vagrancy Act of 1900 came into force 
in 1907. In the drafting process that began in the late 1880s, the problems regarding 
the legal rights of inmates were discussed more seriously by people in positions of 
authority.
THE COMING OF THE VAGRANCY ACT OF 1900
The appointment of a new Criminal Law Commission in 1885 paved the way 
for the new Vagrancy Act. As the primary drafter of the law, Bernhard Getz was 
the driving force in the  commission, and he had a decisive influence on the  content 
and aims of the law. The  commission dealt with vagrancy as early as 1887 in a draft 
for a new criminal code and revisited the question in a draft from 1893, in which 
forced labour  continued to be the principal form of sanction against vagrancy79. In 
1892, Getz discussed the articles  concerning drunkenness in a draft of a new law 
against promiscuity and venereal diseases80. At this time, the use of forced labour in 
workhouses became a heated topic for discussion, leading to the 1894 drafted bill by 
the Criminal Law Commission on workhouses and against vagrancy, begging, and 
drunkenness81. The process of drafting and debating the new Vagrancy Act reveals 
attitudes towards and intended purposes of the existing workhouse system in its final 
decades.
Bernhard Getz argued very strongly against the way forced labour was imposed 
under the Poor Law. He found it to be inconsistent and incompatible with the 
principles of a  constitutional state governed by law. The discretionary power of 
the police, he declared, was “a serious breach with the most important principles 
of the rule of law” to the extent that it had to be changed even without awaiting 
a new Criminal Code82. In the draft of the Vagrancy Bill of 1894, Getz and the 
Criminal Law Commission responded to the objections against the discretionary 
power of the police. The draft  concluded that the difference between forced labour in 
a workhouse and regular punishment of hard labour “was so indistinguishable, that 
the  constitutional principle according to which no one could be punished without a 
 conviction was easily evaded, unless the same requirement to due legal process was 
also applied to forced labour in workhouses”83. In addition, Getz argued that many 
cases of detentions not only violated the Constitution, but was also in breach of the 
1854 act that repealed the obligation to be in employment. This act stated that no 
one could be punished or treated as a vagrant if he or she subsisted without begging 
or being a burden to the public purse. According to Getz, this point was often not 
 considered when the police decreed detention.
78 Olsen (1914, p. 349).
79 Getz (1887, 1893).
80 Getz (1892).
81 Straffelovkommissionen (1894).
82 Getz (1893, p. 119, footnote 1).
83 Straffelovkommissionen (1894, p. 16).
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Getz’ arguments caused important changes as early as 1894. First, police was 
instructed to provide accurate information as justification for each detention, and 
to give suspected vagrants the opportunity to explain themselves. Any decision to 
detain had to be protocolled with a detailed justification84. Shortly afterwards, the 
Department of Justice stated that drunkenness and idleness did not in themselves 
 constitute a sufficient reason for detention ; instead the suspected vagrant had to be 
without legal means of subsistence. Similarly to Getz, the Department also claimed 
that this distinction had often been ignored. They insisted that a precondition for 
detention should be whether the suspect or his family were a burden on society, 
either by receiving poor relief or by begging for a living85. The emphasis on the 
economic burden  constituted by the detainees brought the Norwegian practice more 
in line with the Danish system, which also allowed administrative detention of those 
receiving poor relief. The precondition that the suspected vagrant should  constitute 
a burden was closely  connected to the reconceptualisation of vagrancy that was 
underway in Norway and elsewhere at that time, which saw unemployment as 
inevitable, and  considered a mobile and readily available workforce to be desirable 
in an industrialising society.
Civil servants in the Department of Justice thoroughly scrutinised the decrees 
issued by the police and their justifications and often instructed the local police to 
improve the exactness of the justifications. The police in Bergen in western Norway 
was prescribed to do so as late as 1904, as the Department  complained that previous 
practices were too general and did not  convey sufficient information about the basis 
on which the police decided to detain people86. Obviously, the central authorities 
had motives other than a desire to improve the civil rights of the inmates when 
supervising decrees of workhouse detentions. They suspected that the municipal 
authorities were shifting the expenses of poor relief from the local taxpayers to 
the central authorities, as the latter was partly financing workhouse detentions87. 
This was especially the case when the local police detained old people whom the 
Department assumed might not be able-bodied, and thus not subjected to forced 
labour, but should receive regular poor relief.
The Vagrancy Act was not enacted until 1907, and in the meantime the procedures 
of the old Poor Law were still in effect, though the 1894 curtailment of police 
discretion did have an impact. In 1893, 1,108 men and 230 women were detained 
at the workhouse in Oslo. In 1895, the year after the curtailment, the numbers were 
reduced to 504 men and 119 women88. The reduction was formidable and probably 
far greater than the government expected. The figures increased again for a few years 
(817 men and 239 women in 1897), before they once again gradually decreased. 
In 1906, the last year before the new Vagrancy Act came into effect, 587 men and 
women were detained in Oslo.
84 Resolution from the Crown Prince 7.5.1894, in Love, Resolutioner, Reglementer, Instruxer, Skrivelser 
m.v. vedkommende Fængselsvæsenet 1814-97 (1898).
85 Ibidem.
86 NNA : Justisdepartementet, Fengselsstyret, Kontor D, Db. L0178/ 3A 115 3/1 ‘Opgave over innsatte 
i tvangsarb. anst. II 1904’, JD.JNo 1560/1904.
87 NNA : S-1043 Justisdepartementet, Fengselsstyret D del 1, L0158 ‘Oppgave over innsatte i tvangsar-
beidsanstaltene 1894-1895’ 3A 115 2/6, The  Departementet’s review of detentions from Kristiania 4. 
quarter 1894.
88 Forhandlinger ved den norske kriminalistforenings syvende møte i december 1912 (1912, p. 69).
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The 1894 curtailment also had an impact on the function of the workhouse by 
reducing its effectiveness as an instrument for social  control. An important reason 
for the reduction in detention was the ban on voluntary entry to the workhouse by 
people who were not receiving poor relief. Moreover, the police were no longer 
allowed to honour requests from families and local  communities to remove disorderly 
individuals who were not receiving relief. Both police and paupers seeking voluntary 
admission to the workhouses responded to the change by  constructing a situation 
that did require relief. For example, some paupers would purposefully destroy their 
clothes during arrest so that he or she would have to ask for assistance, thereby 
fulfilling the requirement to be a burden on the public. In August 1894, Anton Olsen, 
nicknamed “Garibaldi”, was arrested for being drunk in public. During the night of 
his arrest, he tore up his clothes, so he was “without a thread to  conceal his nudity”. 
He was provided with new clothes and detained for six months89. Similarly, a few 
days earlier, Johan Jarmann, aged 65, was detained in Oslo. He had never received 
poor relief, except when he was provided with clothes upon his release from the 
workhouse four weeks earlier and was thus  considered by the police as a burden90. 
A large number of similar examples can be found in the written justifications. The 
police also used food given to people under arrest as proof of them being a burden. On 
some occasions, homeless individuals asked to sleep over in the police cells, which 
could likewise result in workhouse detention because the police  considered such 
admissions as a form of relief and  consequently as a burden on the municipality. On 
the other hand, police felt powerless in  controlling prostitutes, who rarely received 
poor relief. This led the government to disregard the additional requirements of 
being a burden, and in 1895, it proclaimed that prostitution was a legitimate reason 
for detaining women.
Police from all areas of Norway, but especially from the larger towns, argued 
against changing the practice of forced labour. In 1894,  Getz’s draft was distributed 
for  comments among the local and central authorities, which resulted in widespread 
objections against the introduction of legal process as a requirement for detention91. 
Objections to such procedures were based on the increased workload and delayed 
detentions for the cases where detention was eventually allowed.
When the Norwegian Parliament started discussing the Vagrancy Bill in 1898, 
the articles on workhouses were separated from the main bill and promoted as a 
separate ‘Prisons and Workhouses Bill’92. Both bills were debated in the parliament 
in 1899, and were passed and sanctioned by the king in 1900. Both were part of 
a major project for legal reform of social policies, which included the 1896 Child 
Welfare Act, the 1900 Poor Law Act, and the new Penal Code of 1902. Most of 
89 NNA, S-1043, Justisdepartementet, Fengselsstyret D del 1, L0157 Toftes gave 1880-1900. ‘Oppgave 
over innsatte i tvangsarbeidsanstalt 3. kvartal 1894. Fengselsregnskap’, 11.8.1894.
90 NNA, S-1043, Justisdepartementet, Fengselsstyret D del 1, L0157 Toftes gave 1880-1900. ‘Oppgave 
over innsatte i tvangsarbeidsanstalt 3. kvartal 1894. Fengselsregnskap’, 9.8.1894.
91 NNA, Justisdepartementet, Lovavdelingen – RA/S-3212/D/De/L0080/0002, ‘Erklæringer angående 
utkast til lov om løsgjengeri, betleri og drukkenskap samt om tvangsarbeidshuse’, 1895.
92 Stortingets forhandlinger ; Oth. prp. No.2 : ‘Ang. Lov om Løsgjængeri, Betleri og Drukkenskab’ 
(1898-1899). [Records of Proceedings of the Storting 1898-1899 ; Proposition to the Storting (Bill) 
No.2 on Vagrancy, begging and drunkenness] and Stortingets forhandlinger ; Oth. prp. No.3 : ‘Om 
Fængselsvæsen og Tvangsarbeide’ (1898-1899). Records of Proceedings of the Storting 1898-1899 ; 
Proposition to the Storting (Bill) No.3 on Prisons and Workhouses].
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these were mainly drafted by Getz and passed only with minor changes. Hence, the 
criticism emanating from the police was disregarded by Parliament.
Individuals subjected to punishment according to the Vagrancy Act were able-
bodied persons who were a burden to the public, idle persons who were not a burden 
to the public, but suspected of regular acts of crime, as well as beggars, casual 
drunkards, and alcoholics. In this sense, the new Vagrancy Act did not differ much 
from the corresponding articles of the old Poor Law. The target groups seemed to be 
the same. However, the Vagrancy Act made changes in three different ways. First, 
the spirit of the old Poor Law was exclusively repressive towards the inmates. By 
 contrast, the new law included elements relating to care and assistance. A punishment, 
according to the law, was not only to serve as a reprimand and a deterrent, but also 
to provide help and assistance to alcoholics. However, this element was severely 
curtailed when the law came into effect as no curative institution was established 
as intended. A change was also seen in the new procedures according to which idle 
persons first had to receive a warning by the police and had to be offered some 
opportunity to work before they could be punished.
Second, the act introduced legal proceedings. Court could delegate to the public 
prosecutor the decision to  commute a prison sentence into workhouse detention – 
very similar to the practise in the Imperial German Penal Code. The argument for 
this system was that the police and officials acting for the public prosecutor had the 
most intimate knowledge about the vagrants and therefore were most  competent to 
assess if forced labour was necessary in individual cases and if so, for how long93. 
As for alcoholics, their detention required  convictions for being intoxicated in public 
at least three times within the last year.
Third, the length of detentions was  considerably extended. A first-time  conviction 
for vagrancy or for being intoxicated in public resulted in a prison sentence or forced 
labour for up to eighteen months. In case of repeated  convictions, the maximum 
sentence was normally three years, but as long as six years if the accused was 
suspected of  committing crimes punishable with prison sentence.
The introduction of judicial decisions, with their requirements of proof being 
able to stand up in court, caused discontent with the act. In 1914, the  chief  constable 
in Bergen expressed the  police’s frustration by claiming that the need for  conclusive 
evidence had, to a large extent, paralysed the ability of the police to protect society 
from vagrants94. The number of workhouse detentions indicated the effective and 
pragmatic nature of forced labour during the Poor Law  compared with the Vagrancy 
Act. Each year between 1901 and 1905, an average of 735 men and 262 women were 
detained in workhouses in Norway95. By  comparison, only 114 men and 33 women 
were on average were incarcerated each year between 1907 and 1913, the period 
93 Stortingets forhandlinger ; Indst. O. XIX. (1898-1899, p. 5). [Records of Proceedings of the Storting 
1898-1899 ; Recommendation No.19 from the standing Social Questions Committee regarding bill 
on Vagrancy, begging and drunkenness] and Stortingets forhandlinger ; Oth. prp. No.2 : ‘Ang. Lov 
om Løsgjængeri, Betleri og Drukkenskab’ (1898-1899, p. 15). [Records of Proceedings of the Stor-
ting ; Proposition to the Storting (Bill) No. 2 on Vagrancy, begging and drunkenness].
94 Olsen (1914, p. 350).
95 The figures are collected from the Official Statistics of Norway, Norges offisielle statistikk, Fengsels-
styrelsens Aarbog, Kristiania [Oslo] 1901-1906 [Official Statistics of Norway] with data from 1901-
1906. The figures show the number of inmates excluding men incarcerated according to the law on 
fathers’ obligation to pay maintenance for  children from 1892.
52 FRODE ULVUND
that followed the introduction of the Vagrancy Act. The dramatic reduction can 
partly be explained by the increased duration of detention. However, the figures also 
demonstrate that the new requirements for evidence were obstructing the police in 
their task of cleansing the streets.
By introducing the judicial verdicts, the Vagrancy Act for the most part 
represented a change in shape rather than in actual  content  concerning the deprived 
groups among the marginalised proletariat of the towns. The main target groups 
and the purpose of detention remained the same, though the spiral of detention was 
slowed by the judicial proceedings. At the time, alcoholism was beginning to be 
regarded as an illness. In reality, however, the target groups of the Vagrancy Act 
were still  considered a source of disorder that had to be disciplined and detained, and 
not  conceived as sick patients in need of treatment.
CONCLUSIONS
Detentions in workhouses on the basis of discretionary police decrees without 
involvement of the judiciary and legal system served a multiplicity of functions. 
This is the reason why the practice remained largely uncontroversial for so long. 
Detention was a flexible solution for the police to intervene against “the dangerous 
class”, and the workhouse inmates were regarded both by the police and by the public 
as outcasts of society, even ranking below most criminals. The Poor Law was a very 
efficient instrument to cleanse the streets of troublemakers and habitual criminals 
whose criminal acts were difficult to prove in court. Furthermore, the workhouse 
provided an opportunity for neighbours and families to shift the responsibility for 
disorderly individuals to the authorities. At the same time, the workhouse  constituted 
a last resort for destitute paupers. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century 
was this practice seriously questioned, leading to the abolition of the discretionary 
workhouse system in Norway. However, the motives behind this change were not 
based on  concerns for the paupers and vagrants who were subjected to detention. 
Rather, it was a professional project initiated by Bernhard Getz, a leading legal 
scholar and Director General of Public Prosecution, to adapt the legislation to 
 comply with the principles on the rule of law and counteract the duality between 
protection of civil liberties and the need for effective public order policing which 
prevailed in  contemporary liberal jurisprudence. Finally, a reconceptualisation of 
vagrancy stemming from the changing needs of a modernising labour market helped 
to bring about reforms that distinguished clearly between involuntary unemployment 
and vagrancy. The Vagrancy Act of 1907 had the same repressive and  controlling 
purpose as the Poor Law of 1845. Similarly the key target groups remained the same 
until the law was repealed in 1970, although the Vagrancy Act turned out to be less 
efficient because formal police discretion was curtailed.
Dr. Frode Ulvund
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